Thoughts – καλόν ἐστιν ἡμᾶς ὧδε εἶναι

(sách) Crime and Punishment – Tội ác và hình phạt

Cuối cùng, Rodion cũng thức dậy được sau những cơn ác mộng mà chàng từng cho là hiện thực đời sống chàng. Chàng là Lazarô mà Đức Giêsu, qua Sonya, đã hồi sinh từ cõi chết. Đó thật là sự cứu rỗi.

Mùa dãn cách vừa rồi mình có ngài Dostoyevsky là một trong những bạn đồng hành. Đêm qua một chuỗi các giấc mơ làm mình thức dậy, đầu tiên là những giấc mơ kì cục, rồi trở nên kinh dị. Mỗi lần thức, mình xem giờ. Mình mừng vì cuối cùng cũng sáng. Và mình nghĩ đến Rodion.

Mình đọc Tội ác và Hình phạt vài tuần sau khi bước qua tuổi 23. Và gần như là trớ trêu, Rodion giống mình nhiều điểm, đến mức nếu gặp chắc có thể xưng hô như bạn bè. Cuốn sách nói về tội ác, thật vật, nhưng nó cũng nói về hình phạt như là một trung gian đi đến sự cứu chuộc đối với Rodion. Chàng ta khư khư giữ cái triết lý của riêng mình, và trước khi thức tỉnh, không một lần chàng nhìn nhận những việc mình làm là tội ác. Lương tâm chàng méo mó, ấy vậy mà quá trình ấy diễn ra tự nhiên đến mức đáng sợ – nó hành hạ, nó mưu cầu sự hỗn loạn, nó làm con người ta mất nhân tính, ấy vậy mà, nó cũng được nuôi dưỡng bởi chính chất nền, chính đời sống đã nuôi dưỡng tình bác ái quên mình của Sonya và sự cương trực của Dunya, và nuôi cả sự khiêm nhường của hai người phụ nữ cao đẹp này.

Dostoyevsky has been one of my lockdown companions. Last night I was continually woken up by a series of first-bizarre-then-turned-nightmare dreams. Each time, I checked the time. When the morning finally came I was so relieved. Then I thought of Rodion.

I read Crime and Punishment a few weeks after I’d turned 23. Almost ironically, Rodion was in many ways my equal to the point I find myself and him on a first name basis. It was about crime, yes, but it was also punishment as the mediator to salvation for Rodion. He was indefatigable for his philosophy, and before his awakening, never once had he considered what he did a crime. His conscience was distorted, and yet such a process happened so naturally that it scares you – it was torturing, chaos-demanding, dehumanizing and yet it was nurtured by the very life that nurtured the self-giving love of Sonya and the integrity of Dunya, or the humility of both these two beautiful women.

At the end Rodion woke up from his nightmares which he had long accepted as his reality. He was the Lazarus whom Jesus, now through Sonya, had brought back to life from death. It was indeed salvation.

The magic of books and music

Cái phép thuật mời gọi của sách và nhạc là đôi khi, chúng lối kéo ta vào một thế giới thật khác thế giới ta đang sống và hào phóng mời gọi ta trở thành một phần trong đó, nhưng rồi một ngày khác, thực tại của chúng và của ta va chạm với nhau.

Sách vở, âm nhạc, và cuộc sống ở cùng nhau trong một mối liên hệ tinh tế. Thực tại mình đang sống, với những sách mình đọc gần đây, khiến tác phẩm A simple heart (Một tâm hồn đơn sơ) của Flaubert trở nên một nguồn cảm hứng kỳ diệu quay lại dưỡng nuôi chính thực tại kia. Cũng vì thực tại ấy, Diary of a country priest (Nhật ký của một cha xứ miền quê) của Bernanos và Narcissus and Goldmund (Nhà khổ hạnh và kẻ lang thang) của Narcissus đem được đến cho mình một niềm hy vọng thiêng liêng.

Hay chỉ mới sáng nay sau khi đọc tin tức, mình nhìn thấy bản thân trong chàng Bob Dylan trẻ tuổi, giận dữ. Đó là lần đầu tiên. Mình vẫn luôn ngưỡng mộ ông, nhưng đối mặt với các chủ đề mà hai bác Dylan và Trịnh Công Sơn thường viết về, mình trước giờ vẫn giữ một thái độ “Trịnh” hơn. Nhưng vì những gì xảy ra trong mình, và thế sự đang diễn ra quanh mình, lần này, một Dylan cứng rắn, thẳng thắn cho mình nhiều sự đồng cảm hơn.

The luring magic of books and music is they can, at a time, draw you a world so different from the one you are living and generously invite you to be a part of, then some other times, their realities and yours collide. Now and then, I am amazed at how they are so historical and personal.

They are all in this subtle connection with one another, all the books and songs and life. Now, from my recent reads, the reality I am living makes Flaubert’s A simple heart such an uncanny inspiration that goes back to educate that very reality. It is also for that reality that Bernanos’ Diary of a country priest and Hesse’ Narcissus and Goldmund successfully brought me spiritual hopefulness.

Or just like this morning, after reading the news, I see myself in the angry, young Bob Dylan, for the first time. I have always admired him, but I have been taking a more Trịnh-ish attitude on what they both wrote about. Though, for all that is happening inside and outside of me, the sugar-coating free Dylan speaks just a little louder in me.

(sách) Ngộ Nhận – Albert Camus

Có những lý do cụ thể thôi thúc mình gọi Jan là một người thân “ngoài cuộc” thay vì người thân “xa lạ”.

Như cái tên đã phần nào nói lên, Ngộ nhận của Albert Camus chất chứa những mảnh phận người oan nghiệt, điêu đứng vì những nỗi mang tên “ngộ nhận”. Trong tác phẩm này, nhân vật Jan dường như gần gũi lạ thường: ta gọi anh là nạn nhân, nhưng cũng không khỏi gán cho anh một phần trách nhiệm trong toàn bộ sự tình. Jan – một người thân xa lạ, một đứa con hoang đàng, trở về, và ta được dịp chứng kiến một sự phi lý của định mệnh.

Có những lý do cụ thể thôi thúc mình gọi Jan là một người thân “ngoài cuộc” thay vì người thân “xa lạ”.

Anh không xa lạ như anh nghĩ: anh không xa lạ hơn một kẻ rời xa quê hương 20 năm là bao. Và đã như thế, ta không nên mong đợi một sự chào đón nồng nhiệt, những vòng tay yêu thương hay tình thân ái ngay tức khắc. Nhưng một lẽ thường đã cho ta hy vọng: tình mẫu tử – Jan quay trở lại với quê hương, mà rất cụ thể là với mẹ của mình. Jan ý thức được khi anh đi em gái anh còn rất nhỏ. Như thế, ý niệm về tình mẫu tử kia hẳn đã gieo vào lòng Jan và cả lòng ta những mong đợi. Và đó là cái ngộ nhận đầu tiên.

Nhưng, anh rõ ràng là một người ngoài cuộc: anh đứng ngoài cuộc đời của mẹ và em gái, đứng ngoài sự quan tâm của ông đầy tớ già, đứng ngoài luôn cả mục đích của chính mình. Anh đứng ngoài “sự trở về”.

Jan là một kẻ ngoài cuộc đang nỗ lực để biến mình thành người nhà, với những công cụ mang tên “bổn phận” mà anh tín thác. Câu chuyện này là một chuỗi những phi lý được Jan cố gắng hợp lý hóa:

Mẹ không nhận ra con: vì cuộc đời vùi dập, vì vô cảm, vì dấu vết thời gian, mà cũng có thể vì bà từ chối nhận ra.
Jan chần chừ không nói ra điều cần nói: vì mong đợi, vì hy vọng, vì giới hạn của ngôn ngữ loài người, nhưng cũng có thể vì lòng kiêu hãnh.

Jan mong muốn mang đến hạnh phúc cho mẹ và em gái của anh, vì anh nghĩ rằng họ cần anh. Họ cần anh, nhưng lại không theo cách mà anh nghĩ. Nếu cố gắng thêm vào chút hài hước, mình sẽ nói Jan may mắn hơn chúng ta ở chỗ anh không phải biết rằng ông đầy tớ già đã biết toàn bộ sự tình nhưng vẫn câm lặng. Và chúng ta thì may mắn hơn Maria, vợ anh, vì không tận mắt chứng kiến những điều phi lý tiếp theo đây:

Sự bình thản, vô cảm của Martha sau khi giết anh mình: sự phi nhân vì vong thân của Martha là một sự phi lý lớn.
Sự hững hờ của ông đầy tớ già hay cũng là sự hờ hững của Định Mệnh.

Song, việc Jan chết dưới tay mẹ và em gái của mình không phải là một sự trả giá cho ngộ nhận. Jan chết, là Jan đã bỏ lỡ mất cơ hội để cho đi hạnh phúc. Jan chết, là mẹ của Jan lỡ mất cơ hội sống với căn tính làm mẹ của mình. Jan chết, là Martha lỡ mất cơ hội trở về với tiếng lương tâm. Và rất có thể, là Maria đoạn tuyệt với, mượn chữ của Bùi Giáng, “một đấng Chí Cao không đáp lời nhân gian kêu gọi.”

Jan đã sống, đã có được hạnh phúc. Rồi một ngày có đôi điều trước đây anh chưa từng nghĩ tới bỗng trở nên thật cấp thiết. Jan trở lại quê nhà cùng với hy vọng, nhưng rồi rơi vào cuộc ngộ nhận khốn cùng. Có lẽ, ngộ nhận giữa cái phi lý và cái hữu lý là cái gốc rễ của những ngộ nhận còn lại trên đời.

Wittgenstein and the talk of God

The question of whether religious language is meaningful has sparked fierce debate among philosophers. Religious language refers to any statement or utterance made about the transcendental, or about God. The fundamental disagreement over whether religious language has any significant stems from different philosophies of meaning. For example, on the authority of the verifiability theory of meaning, one cannot extract meaning from a statement that can neither be verified nor falsified. All cognitively meaningful language must be, in principle, either empirically or formally verifiable. Thus, since there is no factual knowledge associated with the statement “God exists”, this statement is deemed meaningless. Alternatively, according to early Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, the talk of God and the transcendental do not deal with facts, so they equitably share the fate as ethics, arts, poetry, etc.: they represent the very limits of language because thoughts and utterances are meaningful only when they correspond to the world. Wittgenstein himself admitted that we could not talk about them, not because it is not worth doing so, but simply because they are beyond the real function of language. The problem here is these truth-conditional theories leave us no choice but to accept the incompetence of language. Music, arts, poetry constitute greatly to the civilization of the human race, still they are essentially meaningless.

The religious language game

Wittgenstein did, however, exchanged his method of truth conditions to that of assertability conditions. His new way of language philosophizing, characterized by language games in their forms of life and the use theory of meaning, frees language from the limit placed on it by truth conditions. Now with what Wittgenstein had informed us, we should consider twice before saying anything like, “That doesn’t make sense!” — After all, what sort of sense are we expecting? Let us take a look at religious language under Wittgenstein’s notion of language game.

From the perspective of the use theory of meaning, what is said is not bound to the verification principle, nor must a word denote any entity at all to gain its meaning. In different circumstances, a word possesses different meanings, and the meaning comes from understanding the specific rules of the language game we are playing. Language has a comparable function to games. Language, like any other game, has its own set of rules. With this theory of use, Wittgenstein had dismantled the fundamental premise on which he established his initial absolute division between what language could properly convey and the so-called “transcendental” values which must remain inexpressible eternally by their very nature (1). Religious language is meaningful insofar as it has a use. The religious could appropriately be categorized as a language game with its own set of meanings (2). The words used in the religious language game might be articulated similarly to other language games, still they are following a different rules; and therefore cannot be deemed meaningless by player of another language game: religious language makes sense in a religious language game as much as scientific language does in a scientific language game. Besides, a language game, just like any game, is not just played. It has a point. It is played to attain certain goals, and it shows what the players consider important (3). The religious language game, therefore, is used to achieve goals it is intended for.

The meaning of religious language

The rules governing the religious language game are radically distinctive. One simply cannot interpret utterances in the religious language game by a set of rules governing another language game, such as science. Unfortunately, such things do happen. Had Wittgenstein ever used the well-known Italian phrase “Traduttore, traditore!” I suppose he would have meant that the translator had either failed to recognize the form of life in which the language of the original text was articulated in, or he had misunderstood the language game the author was engaging in. We make the mistake of assuming people truly mean what we think they mean so often that just leggere can be traditore. We thus miss the point of their language game.

What, therefore, are the goals of the religious language game? Religious language is used for specific purposes that do not include portraying the natural world. Prayers, rites, songs of praise, etc. do not aim to denote entities of reality. Rather, religious language is confessional, and it is used to instill a sense of commitment to a set of moral ideals (4). That is to say, religious language conveys what one believes in instead of claiming truths. Though Wittgenstein himself did not make any definite claim about the purposes of the religious language game, his philosophy inspires many later philosophers in their pursuit of the intelligibility of religious language. George Lindbeck (1984) suggested the experiential-expressive approach, according to which religious doctrines are “non-informative symbols of inner feelings, attitudes or orientations, rough and groping articulations of a core inner experience”(5). According to this approach, the phrase “God is omnipotent”, for example, serves as a manifestation of a human experience rather than a description within the empirical world, and it is a statement that should not be interpreted literally. Because the religious language-game dwells in the religious way of life, employing it users are to commit to that form of life. Prayers and praises bind the speaker to a complex web of emotions, attitudes, and behaviors (6). These employments of religious language happen in the religious practices, such as praying and praising, which are also aimed to achieve certain emotional needs. Commenting on religious practices, Wittgenstein wrote:

“Burning in effigy. Kissing the picture of a loved one. This is obviously not based on a belief that it will have a definite effect on the object which the picture represents. It aims at some satisfaction and it achieves it. Or rather, it does not aim at anything; we act in this way and then feel satisfied.” (7)

Finally, the meaning of religious language is not to be judged by truth-conditioned scientific philosophizing. Though what we are attempting to discuss transcends human language and concepts in the sense that nothing in the empirical world can verify or falsify it, the discussion remains meaningful because it takes place within a language game in which players recognize and follow the rules, thus see its point.

Notes and Reference

(1) Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin. Wittgenstein’s Vienna. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973, p.234.

(2) It is crucial to abolish the unfortunately common misinterpretation that Wittgenstein had characterized religion as a language game: he never did denote religion as a language game. We are only looking at religious language as gaining its meaning from a religious form of life. Again, this religious form of life and religion are two distinct concepts.

(3) Wittgenstein. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1953,

“§564. So I am inclined to distinguish between the essential and the inessential in a game too. The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point.”

(4) Chad Meister. Introduction to Philosophy of Religion. Routledge, 2009, p.151.

(5) Philosophy of Religion: a Critical Introduction. 2^nd Edition.

(6) V. Brummer, Atonement, Christology And The Trinity Making Sense Of Christian Doctrine, 2005, p. 13.

(7) Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Doncaster: Brynmill Press, 1979, p. 4.

(sách) Một nỗi đau riêng – Kenzaburo Oe

Điểu và cô tình nhân đã được cứu rỗi qua một “epiphany” ngay trên con đường đi đến nơi mà cả hai sẽ đánh mất không chỉ 1 linh hồn, mà là 3.

Cuốn này và cuốn Nỗi đau của người, khi đọc mình cảm giác như ngồi trên xe hơi và bị say xe.

Câu chuyện kể ở đây quá nhiễu loạn, quá phi nhân. Lúc đầu đọc mình đã giận dữ, đã lên án những ý định, suy nghĩ của Điểu và cô tình nhân. Trong các nhân vật, cô tình nhân làm mình cảm thấy buồn nôn (theo nghĩa đen và cả nghĩa bóng) nhất. Khi đọc, có đoạn mình đã ghi chú thế này:

“Cô cũng thật sự là không bình thường rồi. Điểu và cô sai, không phải ở mức độ mối quan hệ đâu, nhưng có lẽ ở bản thân cả hai, ở bản chất của cả hai, ở con người tổn thương và hèn nhát của cả hai.”

Nhưng càng đọc mình càng thấy sự nhiễu loạn này là thứ gì mà cả mình nữa cũng có phần trong đó. Không hề bị phóng đại, đó là những suy nghĩ rất thật, quá thật, vì vậy nó mình thấy khó chịu, cảm giác như thể xem một bộ phim bạo lực hay những cảnh máu me giết chóc tàn bạo. Hay còn hơn thế, vì đây là một chuyện riêng, riêng tư đến mức nếu thật sự Điểu đi đến tận cùng của vong thân thì không một ai trên đời, bao gồm cả anh, biết được. Đây là cái rủi ro có thể xảy đến với bất kỳ ai.

Với mình, cách mà bác Kenzaburō Ōe kết thúc câu chuyện thật xuất sắc. Điểu và cô tình nhân đã được cứu rỗi qua một “epiphany” ngay trên con đường đi đến nơi mà cả hai sẽ đánh mất không chỉ 1 linh hồn, mà là 3. Không, họ được cứu, nhưng cái phần rỗi kia có lẽ họ phải cố gắng chuộc lại bằng cả cuộc đời sau đó. Nó một lần nữa khẳng định cái yếu đuối của con người, sự mỏng manh, và cái ranh giới giữa phần “con” và phần “người” luôn có đó nhưng không phải lúc nào cũng được xem trọng.

Hôm đọc xong Nỗi đau của người mình phải đi dọn dẹp hết nhà cửa để cảm thấy sạch sẽ hơn khi làm con người…

To become as little children

It’s about being innocent, simple, and it’s not about trying to have the traits that a child possesses. Rather, it’s about the status of a child and his total submission to his parents.

Greek NT: Nestle 1904 | ΚΑΤΑ ΜΑΤΘΑΙΟΝ 18 1 Ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὥρᾳ προσῆλθον οἱ μαθηταὶ τῷ Ἰησοῦ λέγοντες Τίς ἄρα μείζων ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν; 2 καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος παιδίον ἔστησεν αὐτὸ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν 3 καὶ εἶπεν Ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ στραφῆτε καὶ γένησθε ὡς τὰ παιδία, οὐ μὴ εἰσέλθητε εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν οὐρανῶν. 4 ὅστις οὖν ταπεινώσει ἑαυτὸν ὡς τὸ παιδίον τοῦτο, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ μείζων ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5 καὶ ὃς ἐὰν δέξηται ἓν παιδίον τοιοῦτο ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί μου, ἐμὲ δέχεται·

King James Bible | Matthew 18 1 At the same time came the disciples unto Jesus, saying, Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? 2 And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them, 3 and said, Verily I say unto you, except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. 4 Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven. 5 And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me.

A conversion – a turn – is asked of anyone – even to the disciples who have seemingly left everything to follow Jesus, who wishes to be in the kingdom of heaven, and that is to “humble oneself as a little child.”

In Jewish society, the notion of “being like little children” might be really different from how we now perceive it. Rather than for their innocence, enthusiasm, delight or simplicity, a Jewish child was here mentioned, more historically logical, for the fact that they were of no importance in their contemporary society: children are of no authority, no power, and no threat. Children are receptive, trustful, and obedient to their parents or the adult of authority: just like how Jesus has always been toward the Father.

But what does it mean to humble oneself as a little child? Although there could be many interpretations to that, there is some evidence in the Bible itself that delineates what it is really like to be humble.

The Greek word used is ταπεινόω – to humble, to humiliate. There are a few more verses in which inflections of ταπεινόω and its family members ταπείνωσις, εως, ἡ and ταπεινός, ή, όν are presented, and among these are two descriptive phrases about Jesus, and Mary:

ΚΑΤΑ ΜΑΤΘΑΙΟΝ 11:29 ἄρατε τὸν ζυγόν μου ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς καὶ μάθετε ἀπ’ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι πραΰς εἰμι καὶ ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, καὶ εὑρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν·
Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls.
ΚΑΤΑ ΛΟΥΚΑΝ 1:48 ὅτι ἐπέβλεψεν ἐπὶ τὴν ταπείνωσιν τῆς δούλης αὐτοῦ. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν μακαριοῦσίν με πᾶσαι αἱ γενεαί·
For he hath regarded the low estate of his handmaiden: for, behold, from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed.

Therefore to be humble as a little child is to be like Jesus and Mary. It’s not about those characters that you normally thought of a child, it’s not about being innocent, simple, and it’s not about trying to have the traits that a child possesses. Rather, it’s about the status of a child and his total submission to his parents. It’s the perfect submission of the Son to the Father, and of Mary to God, manifested through every single event in their lives. I think it is this principle of total submission that springs moral excellence, and not the other way round.

(a review) Abolish the Priesthood by James Carroll

Particularly to priests, to follow the call to be an Alter Christus is an enormous travail which necessarily entails moments and even subsequent actions of vulnerability and helplessness.

Original article: https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/to-save-the-church-dismantle-the-priesthood/588073/

The article being reviewed here was written by James Carroll, published in The Atlantic’s June 2019 print edition. Carroll has strongly addressed the notorious problem of child-abuse in the Catholic church, and as well suggested what he thought to be the justifying solution for this whole situation: the abolition of priesthood. This essay is a humble attempt to a substantive dialogue with Carroll’s positions on whether the abolition of priesthood in the Catholic church is the answer.

In Carroll’s five-part story, clericalism, which he fervently associated with priesthood, is castigated for being both the cause and consolidation for the evils done by the church’s clergy.

Part I – “The murder of a soul” – Carroll accused the head of the church, particularly Pope Francis, for his rather meek and insufficient actions upon the situation.

Part II – The trappings of empire – From Carroll’s observation, the Vatican II, though did reform the Church for better, had failed to address the issue of clericalism, which, in his words, “is at the root of Roman Catholic dysfunction.”

Part III – A tiny opening, Part IV – A culture of denial and Part V – There I am – Clericalism, Carroll claimed, is the underlying drive which allows, encourages, and attaches priests – be they predatory or full of integrity, to mendacity and willed ignorance.

However, I’ve observed some problems with Carroll’s argument: his denial of all theological identity of priests as he condemned priesthood merely to being the tool of clericalism; and his self-referential positions.

First and foremost, priesthood does not establish clericalism. Priesthood is not an artificial instrument to power. Clericalism is. “Clericalism’s origins lie not in the Gospels,” said Carroll, to which I agree. However, that of priesthood, be it of old or new covenant, does (1). Therefore, how come abolishing priesthood has anything to do with fighting clericalism?

To someone this influential, Carroll has taken things way too literally, saying:

When I became a priest, I placed my hands between the hands of the bishop ordaining me—a feudal gesture derived from the homage of a vassal to his lord […] Following this rubric of the sacrament, I gave my loyalty to him, not to a set of principles or ideals, or even to the Church.

Even bishops themselves have taken the vow of obedience to their superiors which ultimately points to THE superior that is God. In their ministry, priests and bishops act in persona Christi: with this basic doctrine in mind, it is obvious the vow of obedience does not compromise any sorts of selfish power-takeover by any individual.

On the Church’s suspension of predatory priests, Carroll claimed that this reflects the pompous perception that a priest is ontological superior than a lay person, to the point that the most severe punishment for a fallen one is to be laicized: to be stripped off of his authority and simply be one of the laity. As Catholic we believe that one goes through ontological changes through the Sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation, and that in The Holy Orders once again one’s ontology changes. But, ontological superiority does not mean “moral betterness”, and laicization of priests does not belittle any layperson. Here, to be like a layperson is a punishment to suspended priests in a sense that they can no longer perform actions grounded in their being (since the ordination leaves in them a mark unable to undo no matter what happens), and therefore could hardly come to life fulfillment (2).

Next, it is not really wise to take one’s own service of a few years to condemn a centuries-old holy sacrament. Carroll’s interpretation of the situation is based on what he himself experienced during his 5 years of priesthood. I find it disappointing that Carroll’s judgement has clearly been distorted by his pessimistic perspective on the clerical hierarchy. Actions have been taken (3), law has been issued (4), dialogues are welcome, and thousands of men and women of the Church are out there consoling and fighting for the victims. Though one might not be satisfied with the improvement just yet, it’s undeniable that efforts are being made.

Carroll has been haunted since once pouring his admiration on a heroic-turn-predatory priest. It is true that our limited and clumsy judgement is complicit in the cover-up of these evils. The thing is when no one is to blame, everyone is to blame (as how I see it in this case, for even the greatest minds have things they do not know of), but since Carroll has placed the blame on priesthood, it becomes what’s bound to capital punishment.

In Part IV, Carroll expanded this view by saying:

At a deeper level, Catholic clerics may be reluctant to judge their predatory fellows, because a priest, even if he is a person of full integrity, is always vulnerable to a feeling of having fallen short of an impossible ideal: to be “another Christ.” Where in such a system is there room for being human?

Here Carroll’s point seems to me invalid, because striving for moral perfection and being human do not mutually exclusive. Instead, the journey of perfecting one’s self matures human. Particularly to priests, to follow the call to be an Alter Christus is an enormous travail which necessarily entails moments and even subsequent actions of vulnerability and helplessness. However, such an invitation to constant moral fights enables one to, first be aware of, and then commit to eliminate one’s natural inclination to evils. Among priests and priests-to-be, there are misunderstandings of the idea of being morally perfect, but I believe it is more of a problem of education and spiritual orientation, rather than priesthood itself. On the other hand, Carroll might once again have taken the bible phrase literal, while “to be perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect.” works out in gracious love and compassion (5), rather than in being sinless.

In Carroll’s words, priesthood is, at the same time, a reprehensible and piteous life in which one cannot escape from the manipulation of clericalism. While Carroll’s loathing for clericalism is sensible, and even admirable, he has made a mistake assimilating holy priesthood to mundane clericalism. And that alone makes his whole argument invalid.

Notes

(1) Among the many, we can confer Act 10, 1 Peter 2, and Romans 12.

(2) Agere sequitur esse (action follows being) is a principal of Thomist ontology. According to this principal, “fulfilled being derives its meaning from the act of existing according to our design”

Cf. https://www.catholicman.uk/agere-sequitur-esse/4594409013

(3) On December 2019, Pope Francis lifted Pontifical Secrecy rule for sex abuse cases. Read more: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50824842.

(4) Vos Estis Lux Mundi

(5) Cf. Barnes’ Notes on the Bible and Expositor’s Greek Testament Commentary on Matthew 5:48.